



ALLIED OR RIVALS? THE BREAK IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND PAKISTAN DURING 1950-61

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Abstract

Every country maintains relationships with other nations to ensure it continues prospering and remains relevant in the global scene. After independence, Pakistan developed a relationship with the United States that can be described as tenuous with a twisted history. The two countries formed a nominal partnership during the 1950s and shared values in the 1980s; however, a significant part of their association was mainly based on their hidden interests. These interests have allowed the two nations to proceed without friction in their relationship. This study analyses and sheds light on the relationship between Pakistan and the U.S. from 1950 to 1961 during President Eisenhower Era. A variety of factors to the importance of the relationship emanate, with Pakistan strongly requiring economic backing and security from India, mainly resulting from the Kashmir and Afghanistan on the Pashtunistan issue. On the other hand, the U.S. utilizes Pakistan's strategic location to fight off communism. Washington allied with the Karachi enhancing their ties and ensuring both the nation's interests are met. The result was a formation of bodies such as Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO), Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) where Pakistan received billions of dollars and military aid, while the U.S. used Pakistan to fight the communist narrative. Additionally, the security and political ties between Washington and Karachi are discussed with a focus on aspects such as mistrusts resulting from the U.S. dictating specific reservations, the enhancement of the relationship between the United States and India, and the Kashmir and Afghanistan issues. It is evident that the relationship between Pakistan and the U.S. between the periods under investigation was purely based on goodwill, despite the presence of the problems mentioned.

KEY WORDS: Washington, Karachi, Kashmir, MEDO, SEATO, CENTO

INTRODUCTION

Maintaining a beneficial relationship that does not infringe on another's rights is one of the most challenging feats for countries in the current time. With the change of leadership, many countries lose allied partners because of changing priorities and values stemming from the leadership model adopted by each president. The relationship between Pakistan and the United States (U.S.) depicts a friendship that moved from being close, during President Eisenhower, Nixon and Regan's era's, to one that is strained during the periods between President John F. Kennedy to Donald Trump. Even with the nature of the relationship currently, instances are showing that the relationship was never devoid of conflict, but management strategies varied. The relationship was solely based on shared interests.

Karachi, the capital city of Pakistan at the time, had identified several motives to an alliance with the U.S. Security concerns against India were among the key reasons that pushed the Pakistani's to that conclusion (Unterberger 1981). On the other hand, The U.S. had been fighting communism for centuries. In 1947, the United States Secretary of State, George Marshall, highlighted the strategic value of Pakistan to the fight against communism. The Secretary of State advised President Truman of the strategic location which Pakistan held

in the world as well as other Muslim states around the globe. Pakistan, to the U.S., was valuable and essential (Manserghet al 1970, 905-28). It was the most influential nation around the area, with Delhi remaining neutral to the fight during the time. The U.S. was at its peak in the fight against communism with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) acting as the main threats to the South Asian and the Middle East regions. For Pakistan, the alliance with the U.S. was a breath of fresh air as it guaranteed the country remained secure and attained large sums of money to keep the economy stable. For the U.S., Pakistan was very well positioned to fight communism (Ibid, 908). However, as is familiar with all relationships, there were specific factors that ultimately caused distress to the partnership. Military, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and economic issues were some of the factors that led to the development of a strained relationship between Karachi and Washington. These aspects of the ties are also vital to the history of the political and security partnership between the two nations (Ibid); to determine the extent of the relationship and implication of the said factors, this study focuses on historical literature that provides a record of the U.S. and Pakistan partnership between 1950 and 1961. The study investigates Pakistan's condition before independence and follows President Truman and Eisenhower during their terms, as it was during this period that the alliance between the U.S. and Pakistan began a saw a lot of strain in their relationship.

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S FOREIGN POLICY

President Eisenhower's inauguration in January 1953 boasted of a leader who put much more effort into the fight against communism. Pakistan's strategic location was impressed upon the president and the need to ensure that the country was used as a free world defense block against communist countries and agendas (Chatterji and Chaudhry 2014, 25-6). In light of this, John Foster Dulles, a more robust anti-communist than others who came before, was selected as the Secretary of State. Pakistan was seen favoured while India became unfavourable due to its neutral policy on communism. Dulles was of the idea that Karachi's stand against communists, the military power, and religious convictions it held could be of crucial advantage against the USSR (Kux 2001, 55-7). The plan and view the U.S. had of Pakistan were openly announced in 1953, and Washington followed through with this by scheduling a visit to South Asia. The media popularised the need for feedback to understand the stand of Karachi, whether it was open to the new U.S. government. During this time, there was a lot of political anxiety in Pakistan, which saw the nomination of Mohammed Ali Bogra as the new Prime Minister of Pakistan (Ibid).

PAKISTAN AND U.S. ALLIANCE

On 22-23rd May 1953, the Secretary of State, Dulles, visited South Asia and the Middle East. Pakistan welcomed the U.S. official, who met with the Defence and Home Ministers, Bogra Ghulam Muhammad, and Ayub Khan. Pakistan was open and willing to join the U.S. in the free world camp and become an allied partner fighting against the communist cause. The Defence Minister further highlighted Dulles highlighted the importance of fighting against the communist cause and the threat which lay ahead for Central, South Asia, and the Middle East. The proposal the Karachi was offering ensured that the regions in focus would be adequately defended against the communism threat, provided Pakistan received the necessary military aid it required (MacCloskey 1967, 87-93). The economic state of Pakistan and military weakness was also discussed with Pakistan highlighting that if the U.S. was willing to cooperate with them, the mere alliance between the two might assist in ensuring India backs out of the Kashmir issue. The genuine honesty of Pakistan to partner with the U.S. and fight against the communist cause was not lost to Dulles. During the visit, Dulles was massively impressed by the willingness and honesty of the Pakistani officials in partnering with the U.S. and ensuring that they do their part to maintain the spread of

communism in South Asia. The same was communicated to Washington during Dulles Stay in Turkey, to the leadership in the White House (FRUS 1953, May 26). Dulles believed that the willingness of the country could be extremely beneficial for the U.S. when building a defense scheme in the Middle East. Additionally, on June 1st of that year, Dulles met with the National Security Council (NSC) and praised Pakistan's religious stand and the martial qualities it possessed. Nehru was not impressed by Dulles's comments (FRUS 1953, June 1).

However, as time passed on, Pakistan continued to grow more impatient. There was seemingly no communication on the stand of the U.S. Ayub Khan, the Home Minister, visited Washington and met with Henry A. Byroade, a state Department official, and Dulles, later that year, seeking the final decision of the U.S. on the state of the alliance (Kux 2001, 55). The American's it seemed were slow on tabling the matter to President Eisenhower. In December of that year, Dulles, during his stay in Bermuda, communicated that they were interested in Pakistan's proposal but were not sure what kind of assistance they would offer. A meeting held between President Eisenhower, Dulles, and Charles E. Wilson, formalized the need for Karachi to receive support as long as the U.S. lived within its limits and laws; this meant that even with the continued requests by Pakistan to receive military aid, the U.S. did not act on this immediately (MacCloskey 1967, 91-2). On the 19th of May 1954, an alliance between the two countries was announced, and on 21st October of the same year, the U.S. approved secret aide-memoire to funnel military assistance in the country through an agreement termed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the U.S. In the same year, Pakistan became a member of the South East Treaty Organization (SEATO) together with the U.S., Britain, France, Thailand, The Philippines, Australia and New Zealand (Ibid). The next year, 1955, Pakistan also joined the Baghdad Pact, a mutual defense organization comprised of Britain, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq (FRUS 1955, February 28). The Baghdad Pact was later renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) after Iraq left the pact (MacCloskey 1967, 91-2).

For the U.S., the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, to avoid any clashes with other nations, it was unanimously agreed that before any military action was taken in Pakistan and all the signatories under the treaty would have to be consulted. Additionally, whatever the terms of aggression, the U.S. would only provide and continue to do so where the attack was explicitly related to the anti-communist cause. The U.S. maintained that its aid to Pakistan was solely for the need, should it arise, to protect the Middle East and South Asia against the communist cause and that Pakistan was very well positioned, unlike any other country for the same. Additionally, the U.S. wanted to ensure that the said agenda was not already imposing on the weak economy of Pakistan, but ensure the country is well strengthened to assist should a time like that come. Bogra vowed that the assistance it would receive from the U.S. would not be used to enact any act of aggression against any other nation (Chatterji and Chaudhry 2014, 26).

THE UNITED STATES BASES IN PAKISTAN

For the U.S., creating a base in Pakistan ensured it achieved a particular strategic advantage over communist nations. Peshawar base in Pakistan was close to Russia, ensuring that the U.S. could easily enhance its surveillance on the USSR (FRUS 1949). For the USSR, the idea of the U.S. having such proximity to it was not advantageous. It is for this reason that Nikita Khrushchev, USSR's Premier, visited Kashmir and India, with the primary intention being to have a meeting with the leaders and oppose the plan to have a U.S. base in Pakistan (Haqqani 2013, 77). Bogra, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, denied the claims made by Krushchev, declaring that Karachi did not have any intentions to allow Washington or any country build a military base in the country (Ibid). When the statement got back to Washington, The new Ambassador to Pakistan, Horace Hildreth met with the Head of State

and Governor-General of Pakistan, Iskander Mirza. Of course, Bogra responded positively to Hildreth and asked for security against any external threats, especially regarding the Kashmir issue (FRUS 1955, December 13).

At the beginning of 1958, both Washington and Karachi sat and had a discussion on which locations were most suitable to have the military bases. Peshawar and Bedaber were the most favourable locations (Kux 2001, 112-3). Both Washington and Karachi signed an agreement to that effect. These air force bases were used to spy on the Russians and were kept hidden from the Pakistani people. The truth of America's activities in Pakistan would be revealed two years later, on May 1st when the USSR shot down an American U-2 spy plane that was within their territory (FRUS. 1958). To the public, Pakistan acted shocked; however, Ayub Khan inadvertently confessed that while they were negotiating with Washington, there was a mild expectation that such an act would be conducted by the Americans (Malik 2016, 25-8).

TREATIES BETWEEN THE U.S AND PAKISTAN

In September 1954, after Pakistan had signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement treaty, The Secretary of State for the U.S., Dulles, and other members from Britain came up with the need to ensure there was a collective defense against the communist cause. From this meeting came the idea for the development of a joint defense known as the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) (Khan 1964).

The Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO)

The SEATO treaty included the U.S., Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, The Philippines, and Thailand. After Pakistan signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, Britain saw the need to include South Asia in the treaty and hence advocated for the addition of Pakistan in the settlement (Ibid). Other nations in South Asia were also invited to participate and become members of the SEATO; however, only Pakistan showed up for the meeting. Dulles was recorded stating that Pakistan was a powerful military nation among other South Asian countries, and hence Washington needed to ensure they were allied to them.

For Pakistan, joining the SEATO was a strategic move aimed at ensuring it was protected from communism and against Afghanistan and Kashmir. In seeking to ally with Washington, Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan of Pakistan focused on convincing Washington other external aggressions existed, and Pakistan could help (FRUS 1952-54). Pakistan focused and sold itself as a nation that could aid the U.S. in ensuring South Asia and the Middle East remained under a free rule and did not succumb to communist rule. With the agreement looming for a while, Pakistan hoped that the U.S. would also be in a position to assist them when managing issues of security (Chatterji and Chaudhry 2014, 26). As it were, Pakistan though it had a vast army, was economically unstable and did not have enough military equipment. However, the U.S. was not willing to intervene in matters concerning Pakistani's security, especially against the Indians. Hence, for Pakistan, SEATO was a move it hoped would provide some of the protection needed (Ibid).

The Baghdad Pact

Washington, after the development of the SEATO, also saw the need to establish another pact with countries bordering Russia and the Middle East to ensure complete neutralization of the communist threat. The U.S. developed the Pact of Mutual Cooperation, also known as the Baghdad Pact that had borrowed many of its principles from the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) treaty that became defunct in 1953 after President Truman left the office. The Baghdad pact was enacted on 24th February 1955, in Baghdad,

Iraq. The nations under this treaty included Iraq, Iran (joined in April 1955), Britain (joined in April as well), and Pakistan (joined in September of the same year). The U.S. was not a formal member; however, it supported the idea and acted as an associate member. The Karachi leadership accepted the invitation to join the organization as a means to protect itself from the Delhi government and also to gain assistance from the U.S. (Ibid). This organization was known as the 'Northern Tier.'

CENTO and the Death of Baghdad Pact

In 1957-8, Britain's empire continued to struggle. There were a series of developments in the Middle East, among them, being the Iraqi revolution, civil turmoil in the state of Lebanon, and the union between Egypt and Syria (The Eisenhower Doctrine 1957). All these activities contributed to the weakening of the Baghdad Pact. The U.S. began its interventions in Lebanon to calm the state. It was able to do so due to the proposal presented by Eisenhower in a joint session of Congress. Conditions in the Middle East began deteriorating in 1956. It was primarily believed that the actions of Gamal Nasser, an Egypt leader, were to blame (Ibid). Nasser had become very close with the Soviet Union and exhibited increasing opinions showing that he was against Western nationalism. Due to this stance adopted by Nasser, the support Washington had given to Egypt in the construction of the Aswan Dam on the River Nile was withdrawn in July of 1956 (MacCloskey1967, 91-2). Nasser, after the action of the U.S., coordinated an attack and seized control of the Suez Canal, less than a month later. In October of the same year, the French, British, and Israeli armies mobilized and led a coordinated attack against the military forces of Egypt; this appeared to be the onset of world war III, where the Middle East would act as the battlefield (The Eisenhower Doctrine 1957). To counter this, President Eisenhower, in January of 1957 called for a joint meeting between Congress and the executive to discuss the increased danger of International communism in the Middle East (MacCloskey1967, 91-2). Eisenhower believed that there was a need to develop new programs that ensured nations that were still friendly in the region were protected, and their political and territorial integrity was secured. Washington called for programs that would see partnerships with the friendly nations and thus ensuring the development of economic and military incentives aimed at protecting the regions from communist rule. Washington provided \$200 million in financial aid between 1958 and 1959 as a means to dissuade the communist nations from interfering in the Middle East. The proposal was voted for and approved. It came to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine (Ibid).

In 1958, there was civil unrest in Lebanon, an event which saw the first call of action to the Eisenhower Doctrine. America was in a position to intervene and calm the situation. However, in light of this, Iraq was against the intervention of American and, in 1959, quit its membership in the Baghdad Pact. With Iraq out of the pact, the remaining members saw it fit to call it the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) (U.S. Department of State Archive 1955).

The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)

The CENTO was a treaty that saw the U.S. also acting as an associate member. The deal was meant to ensure the members had economic safety. A large part of the agreement was that all members would be provided for financial aid, where the member nations were facing any economic challenges (MacCloskey1967, 89). The U.S. ensured that each of the members was aware that the treaty did not provide a military advantage. It did was not meant to dictate the participation of members in the organization and development of military command, nor did the pact guarantees military defense for any of its members. Both Iran and

Pakistan would announce their withdrawal from the treaty in 1979 when Iran's revolution begun and due to other issues for Pakistan (U.S. Department of State Archive 1955).

For Pakistan, being a member of SEATO and CENTO provided it with enough economic security. Washington had provided opportunities through its pact with Pakistan for the nation to strengthen its economy over the years through the resources acceptable to it (MacCloskey 1967, 92; Khan 1967, 275).

ANOTHER GO AT KASHMIR SETTLEMENT

When President Truman left office in 1953, Eisenhower ascended into office. During this time, the Kashmir issue was at its peak, and the Truman administration had just declared no solution could please Pakistan and India. Eisenhower's administration was aware of the importance of Pakistan and the importance of the Kashmir issue to Pakistan. Washington, at this point, decided to try and bring forth a solution that was not steered by the United Nations (Schofield 2003, 41-2). In light of this, the U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, was nominated by the Assistant Secretary of State for U.N. Affairs and The U.S. Ambassador to South Africa and the Philippines, to retry the framework of settlement for the Kashmir issue. A plan was secretly devised, and the president of the Ford Foundation, Paul Hoffman was sent to Delhi and Karachi to conduct bilateral talks in 1953 (Ibid).

Paul Hoffman travelled to India and Pakistan in April of that year and had very fruitful talks with Nehru and Bogra. Both these leaders agreed to have bilateral discussions regarding the Kashmir issue (FRUS 1953). The next month, Dulles visited India and Pakistan and discussed the partition of Kashmir as a solution to the long-standing problem. Nehru agreed to the decision of the partition, but Bogra denied claiming that they had no right to draw a partition to separate the Kashmir people's, that was against their rights and also that it was easier to rely on the will of the people but carrying it out was a different case altogether. This conclusion led to the determination that the issue would be solved at another time. Dulles set the date to be in 1959 (FRUS 1952-54, May 23).

When December of 1959 rolled around, President Eisenhower made a personal visit to South Asia meeting Nehru and Ayub Khan. Washington believed that continuous intervention in the matter seeking to provide a solution could ultimately create a stronger bridge of conflict than that which existed. For Ayub Khan, the U.S. was in a position to stand with Pakistan, as the country was openly and willingly engaging in the anti-communist cause for the U.S. (Schofield 2003, 45-7). With the commitment, the country had shown the U.S. there was no reason the U.S. could not do the same for Pakistan in the Kashmir issue. However, for Nehru, Pakistan lacked stable roots and its involvement in Kashmir could not yield the results the country expected. Ultimately, the Eisenhower administration was unable to come up with a solution that was feasible to both nations leaving the issue unsolved (Ibid).

ANOTHER GO WITH AFGHANISTAN

With the continued strain in the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it was not long before another conflict erupted. At the beginning of 1955, Pakistan decided to integrate its North Western Frontier territory as a new province of Pakistan. This move was not taken well by people in Kabul. The result was civil unrest in Kabul that attacked the Pakistani embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. This act of violence was also not well taken in Pakistan, and the Afghanistan Embassy in Pakistan was attacked by Pakistani's. There was additional tension in the Paki-Afghanistan border that also heightened stress levels in Washington, as they feared Afghanistan might seek an alliance with the USSR. To curb this, the U.S. communicated to Pakistan the fear they had and set a meeting date to settle the issues they were facing with Afghanistan. The U.S. managed to resolve the crisis between the two nations (Kux, 2001, 77).

STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND PAKISTAN

Pakistan, since independence had made clear the intentions and alliances it needed with the U.S. Reasons for this alliance were stipulated by the Karachi leadership. Moreover, Pakistan was well aware of the strategic location is held in the fight against communist causes in South Asia and the Middle East. What Pakistan continually sought was security threat from India, Afghanistan, and by extension, the USSR should it come to that; however, the U.S. was very reluctant to commit to providing military assistance that would see the protection of Pakistan from these threats. With time, the reluctance of the state created a strained relationship between the two nations.

In 1955 a visit to Pakistan by Struve Hensel, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs strained the U.S. Pakistan relationship as he reported that Pakistan was not aware of the role it should play in maintaining a defense against the communist cause in the Middle East. Pakistan could not focus on preserving security when it considered the threats from India, the USSR or China more severe (FRUS 1955, February 17). Additionally, the Pakistani government had begun becoming restless over the slow flow of aid from Washington, slowly bringing up the conclusion that Washington was not trustworthy. Ayub Khan asserted that the pressure against the U.S. was slowly rising in Pakistan and more people stated that Khan should not cooperate with the U.S. The Undersecretary of State, Herbert Hoover Jr., sent a memo to the Department of Defense highlighting Khan's concerns and warning that Pakistan would soon withdraw from an alliance with the U.S. should their needs be pushed aside continually (FRUS 1955, November 5). Besides, the strategy to defend the Middle East and South Asia from the communist cause could prove futile should Pakistan withdraw their relations with the U.S (Ibid).

In 1957, President Eisenhower visited Karachi to come up with a new South Asia Policy. A National Security Council meeting was held on January 3rd of that year. The Pakistanis were eager to find out the state of assistance. For the Americans, there was a need to reduce the vast number of militants in Pakistan. The Americans contested that it was very costly for them to continually-support Pakistan when the only purpose the aid was used for was to maintain the vast militia while the militia had not mainly done anything for the USA (FRUS 1957, January 3). For Pakistan, the reduction in the number of troops was not readily welcome, as trust issues had developed. Robert Murphy, the Undersecretary of State, was tasked with the responsibility of convincing Pakistan of the importance of such a move. This request, however, had already started straining the relationship between Karachi and Washington, turning from okay towards bad (Ibid).

EISENHOWER'S SECOND TERM AND WORSENERED PAKISTAN-U.S.RELATIONS

The fight against communism was still active in President Eisenhower's administration. During his inauguration speech, he had explained that communists typically target a newly developed state, as it is economically weak, politically unstable, and can be easily impressed without proper support from other nations. What the U.S. was hoping to achieve by partnering with Pakistan and other countries that have just developed was ensure that the communist cause was halted. For Washington, however, the decision to ally itself with Pakistan had proven to be on was overly costly on the U.S. Three issues had contributed to the worsening of the relationship between Pakistan and the U.S. The first was Pakistan's weak economy and its massive military. The second issue pertained to that of the anti-communist cause where the U.S. allied with Pakistan to defend the Middle East. The third cause was Karachi's use of the financial aid it received from Washington to fight against Delhi. Seventy per cent of the revenue that was issued to Pakistan was used in maintaining the military troops; this was a threat to the development, politics and economic stability of Pakistan (McMahon 1994, 210-2).

For the Pakistani's, various issues were raised regarding the Americans. First, the continuous intervention by the U.S. trying to ensure on-going economic enhancement was taken as a strategy to ensure the U.S. was able to control the politics within Pakistan. America, to the Pakistan leadership, was interfering in internal affairs. Secondly, the Pakistan government's opposition continued to blame the U.S.-Pakistan alliance as an avenue through which the Karachi leadership continued to blame the weakness of the economy. Additionally, the opposition accused the U.S. of the gap in Pakistani's political and economic environment. Thirdly, the relationship between American and Israel was not taken lightly. For the Public in Pakistan, America was Pakistan's worst enemy and could not possibly want anything good to happen to the country. Fourth, maintain a relationship with Delhi, a nation that was neutral to the communist cause, sparked anger in the Pakistani government and its people. They could not understand why the Americans chose to stand with a neutralist when Pakistan stood with the free world camp (Kux 2001, 150-3).

The frustrations faced by Pakistan forced the Karachi leadership to change its argument on the anti-communist narrative. If the U.S. were not willing to support Pakistan on the Kashmir issue and other security threats that existed, then the country would move from the U.S. bloc to the USSR bloc (FRUS 1957, January 10). The state department sent a memo on March 1957, noting all the issues the Karachi leadership mentioned and the intentional decisions that will be made should the U.S. continue to hold support concerning the Kashmir issue. In May 1959, the same stance was reported by the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate stating that the leadership in Karachi had already started discussions on the need to change its policies from Western to communist camps (FRUS 1959, May 5).

FROM WESTERN BLOC TO COMMUNIST BLOC

For the Karachi leadership, it seemed the frustrations they were experiencing were not being taken seriously by Washington. In December 1959, Ayub Khan tried to enhance the anti-communist cause as he sought to explain to Eisenhower that they were still part of the free world camp (FRUS 1959, December 8); however, the country needed to be aided. Eisenhower, however, rejected the stand of the Karachi leadership. This move pushed Karachi to shift from an anti-communist stance to a communist position. The Pakistan government changed allies and moved to the communist bloc.

In the mid-1960s, the relationship between Pakistan and the U.S. continued to worsen, resulting in the need for the U.S. to call back all its air force personnel from Peshawar with immediate effect (FRUS 1960). Washington rejected Pakistan as an ally and replaced it with India, excluding Karachi from the anti-communism list. Pakistan received financial aid from USSR amounting to \$30 million. The Indo-China relations also deteriorated as Karachi stood with Beijing while India stood with Washington against China. President Eisenhower, at the end of his second term, left behind a horrible relationship between the U.S. and Karachi and, much work in policy correction and development for President John Kennedy.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. made many mistakes in its relationship with Pakistan. From the onset, several actions could have been improved to ensure Pakistan remained a free world nation. In the beginning, the U.S. refuted the need to partition India and a Muslim state, claiming that such a division could not be suitable for South Asia. When the British Colonial Government announced the separation and creation of two separate countries, the U.S. continued to support the need for a United India. It was not until the independence celebrations that the U.S. approved of Pakistan as a new state and begun diplomatic relations with the country.

After the Truman Presidency came Eisenhower's first term in 1953. The U.S. developed foreign policies that were against communist threats, and hence, for the state, Pakistan was a crucial ally in maintaining a defense scheme in the Middle East and South

Asia. The U.S., to ensure that the Karachi leadership was certified provided avenues through which Pakistan could address its economic concerns and also went a step further to introduce new avenues to solve the Kashmir issue, mainly introducing the U.N. to resolve the Kashmir issue. However, Washington failed to address the immediate concerns of Pakistan. The Karachi leadership needed support from the U.S., and its slow flow of aid was not helping the nation. This trend continued, and in 1957, President Eisenhower openly confessed that the U.S. was not pleased with the state of the alliance. Washington had been providing aid to Pakistan's, but they had not seen anything in return for the same. What was evident was the ever-growing military of Pakistan's. For the Pakistan government, Washington was not trustworthy as it continued to withhold its support and fuel relationships with other nations that did not support their anti-communist agenda. It is the lack of support, especially with the Kashmir issue that Pakistan forfeited a free world stand and shifted to a communist position, effectively ending all relations with the United States by the year 1961.

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