



INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS DURING THE WAR OF 1971 ERA

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Abstract

Pakistan and India relations always stay on the zigzag way since the partition of the united India. The relations further gone worst during the era of 1971 while East-Pakistan and West-Pakistan's situation gone worst. In this all game, initially, India played the hidden role which openly converted into the war between the Pakistan and India in 1971. This study shed light on the Pakistan and India relations during the said era and explores the relations between both the countries fell into hell and finally converted into war. This study highlight how the India and Pakistan conflict emerged, India's involvement and direct engagement, naval hostilities, Attacks on Pakistan, Ground Operations, emergence of East-Pakistan and further relations gone worst.

Keywords: Pakistan, India, 1971 War, Relations, Hostilities

Introduction

Historical Perspective of Emergence of Pak-India 1971 War

The 1971 battle between Pakistan and India comes up repeatedly in comments on this site, to the point where I've pondered establishing a South Asian version of Godwin's law - that any discourse that lasts long enough will inevitably return to what happened then. At the very least, it seemed sensible to make a post for all 1971-related thoughts. It all started with Khurram Hussain, a Pakistani writer for India's Outlook magazine, who suggested looking at Pakistan through a lens of the 1971 war that culminated in the creation of Bangladesh, then East Pakistan, as the best way to understand the country. However, here are a few snippets from the essay; please read it in full: "Because of this, the Partition's relevance in contemporary South Asian affairs seems to be overshadowed by its hypnotic character, which obliterates the consciousness. All of Pakistan's fears, anxieties, and analytic frames are based on the traumatic vivisection of the country in 1971, not 1947, as a basic reference point. India has rightly concentrated on its own vivisection and dismemberment, whilst Pakistan has focused on the wrong date, which is understandable in this context, there are serious consequences to this miscalculation," he explained (Cheema and Riemer, 1990). As a starting point, many Indians saw 1971 as a victory for India rather than a defeat for Pakistan. It is said to as an Indian intervention to prevent the genocide of Bengalis by Pakistanis. Indian elites have entirely forgotten that the Bengalis were also Pakistanis. Another episode of Pakistan intervening in other people's affairs and the adventurism of the Pakistani military in the region—as is 1971 (Cheema and Riemer, 1990). Intellectual elites in Pakistan and India are horrified by the West Pakistani military's atrocities against civilians in the East. Indeed, no one in their right mind would accept this kind of conduct. Despite the devastation, the Indian state's deliberate opportunism in splitting Pakistan remains a persistent pet peeve. While Pakistan's intellectual elites have consistently decried their government's involvement in terrorist activity in India, they have remained mainly mute on Kashmir, which is why this is the case. What's good for the gander is good for the goose, and vice versa.

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They don't see much of a difference between Kashmir and East Pakistan (Cheema and Riemer, 1990). He has sought to explain why the two countries' historical narratives of the last four decades are so different, whether or not you agree with his thesis. Numerous comments on earlier posts demonstrate the wide range of viewpoints on the events of 1971 and their distinctly divergent effects on India and Pakistan. So, what are your options for bridging that gap?

Indian-Pakistani conflict of 1971

As a result of the Bangladesh Liberation War, West Pakistanis were pitted against East Pakistanis in the Indo-Pakistani struggle. Elections in 1970 saw Awami League win 167 seats in Pakistan's lower house Majlis-e-313, which began the Bangladesh Liberation War. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Awami League leader who claimed the right to form a government in Pakistan, gave six points to President Pervez Musharraf. Military intervention was ordered by Pakistan's President Yahya Khan when PPP leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto refused to hand up power to Mujibur Rahman (Lyon, 2008).

It was decided to disarm East Pakistan's military and police. On March 25th, 1971, the Pakistani army started an attack on Dhaka after a long period of strikes and non-cooperation movements. After its members were ousted, the Awami League was compelled to flee to India. According to Radio Pakistan, Mujib was kidnapped and brought to West Pakistan during the night of March 25–26, 1971. "Searchlight," an assassination attempt on the East's intellectual elite, followed. Major Ziaur Rahman led Pakistan to independence from Pakistan on March 26th, 1971. In April, the Awami League government moved into a temporary exile facility in Meherpur called Baidyanathtala. The East Pakistan Rifles, a paramilitary outfit opposed to the government, joined the uprising. General Mohammad Ataul Ghani Osmany, the head of the Bangladesh Forces, founded the Mukti Bahini organization (Freedom Army). Regular Force and Gono Bahini make up the Bahini called as Guerilla Force (Lyon, 2008).

India's Involvement

About 10 million people fled East Pakistan due to the Pakistani army's systematic genocide of the Bengali people, particularly the minority Hindu population. Refugees can now safely cross Pakistani and Indian borders thanks to opening those countries' borders. There are camps for refugees in West Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura. An already shaky Indian economy was further weakened by the influx of people escaping poverty in East Pakistan (Talbot, 2009).

Tikka Khan was known as the "Butcher of Bengal" for his atrocities while in power. He earned the moniker "Butcher of Balochistan" for his heinous crimes against humanity. As stated by Niazi, 'General Tikka' struck in the night of 25/26 March 1971. What had been a quiet night was now broken by weeping, crying, and even fires. It didn't occur to General Tikka that his people were being misled and tricked while he unleashed the whole force of his military on an enemy. The military attack in Bukhara and Baghdad claimed the lives of Chengiz Khan and Halaku Khan. General Tikka murdered and desecrated people and property alike in his ruthless campaign. "I'm here for the land, not the people," he said to his troops. The verdant countryside of East Pakistan will be turned scarlet, he'd written in his table diary. It was tainted by "Bengali blood (Kemp, 2010)."

No one has reacted despite repeated appeals to the world community. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi made it clear on March 27th, 1971, that her country stands with the people of East Pakistan in their desire for independence. Prime Minister Gandhi led the Indian leadership in concluding that ending the genocide through armed action against Pakistan was more successful

than creating refugee camps for those who made it across the border (Kemp, 2010). An influx of Mukti Bahini insurrectionists headed by exiled East Pakistan army officials and Indian intelligence operatives began training and recruiting at these locations quickly. Because of West Pakistan's increased proximity to East Pakistan and India, jingoism and militarism have taken root in the West Pakistani worldview. Within a month, the back windows of cars in Rawalpindi, Islamabad, and Lahore were plastered with Crush India stickers. The movement quickly spread throughout West Pakistan due to a coordinated propaganda campaign. By October, a new round of "Hang the Traitor" stickers had targeted Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Kemp, 2010).

India's Official Engagement with Pakistan

At this point in November, it appeared that war was inevitable. In November, people in Lahore and across West Pakistan took to the streets to urge that Pakistan defeat India. Indian armies have been being constructed throughout India's borders as a response. The Himalayan roads would be blocked by snow, and the Indian military waited until December to begin operations. To help his people be ready for armed conflict, Yahya Khan issued an order on November 23rd declaring a state of emergency across the entire country (Byman, 2005). It was around 5:40 p.m. local time on December 3rd when the PAF began a preemptive strike on 11 Indian airfields, including Agra, located less than 300 miles from Pakistan's border. Taj Mahal was surrounded by branches and leaves and burlap when attacked because it's marble sparkled like a beacon in the moonlight (Nawaz, 2008). During the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Israel's Operation Focus served as a model for Operation Chengiz Khan. Unlike Israel's attack on Arab airbases in 1967, Pakistan flew only 50 planes to India. This is important (Nawaz, 2008). This was followed by the Indian Air Force's early air attacks after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared the strikes a war against India that night in New Delhi. The following morning, a large retaliatory airstrike was launched in reaction to the earlier attacks. With this move, the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War has formally commenced. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi gave the order to begin mobilizing soldiers and launching the invasion right away. Indian forces undertook a considerable air, sea, and land assault. Keeping Pakistan from invading Indian Territory was India's primary goal on the eastern front and stopping Pakistan from entering Indian Territory on the western front. Invading West Pakistan in a large-scale manner was not something India had in mind.

Naval Hostilities

Pakistan's PNS Ghazi, which went down off India's eastern coast near the Visakhapatnam fairway buoy, was the first submarine to go down in the Indian Ocean. The Pakistani Navy has begun naval surveillance operations using submarines on the east and west coasts. During Operation Trident, the Indian Navy, led by Vice Admiral S.N. Kohli, successfully attacked Karachi's port, sinking the Pakistani destroyer PNS Khyber and the minesweeper PNS Muhafiz on the night of December 4–5. This action also resulted in significant damage to the PNS Shah Jahan (Leonard, 2013). In retaliation, Pakistani submarines hunted down important Indian ships. Additionally, Pakistan's commercial ships and reserves of fuel were destroyed, making it more difficult for the Pakistani Navy to participate in future fights. Pakistan also lost 720 of its sailors. December 8–9, the night of December 8–9, saw Indian missile boats strike Karachi's harbor and sink three Pakistani commerce ships (Leonard, 2013). East Pakistan and eight foreign commercial ships were entirely cut off from the rest of the world by an Indian naval blockade in Bengal, led by Vice Admiral Krishnan. Fighter-bombers from the INS Vikrant aircraft carrier bombed many coastal towns in East Pakistan on December 4th (Leonard, 2013).

Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar are also included. Pakistan dispatched PNS Ghazi in response to the threat. Still, it sank off the coast of Visakhapatnam on the route there, leaving no survivors (Cohen, 2004). Although Pakistan's grip on the Bangladeshi coastline is thinning off, the country is still making a solid showing. Indian Navy suffered its worst combat loss on December 9th when Pakistan's submarine PNS Hangor sunk the frigate INS Khukri and killed 176 crew members in the Arabian Sea (Cohen, 2004). At least seven gunboats, one minesweeper, two destroyers, three coast guard patrol craft, 18 cargo and supply vessels, and substantial damage to the Karachi naval base and ports were sunk in the attack on the Pakistani Navy. Apprehended are 10 smaller vessels, including the Anwar Baksh (three ships), the Pasni (three boats), and the Madhumathi (three boats). Indian forces captured 1413 Bangladeshi troopers in Dhaka while losing almost 1900 soldiers. A Pakistani researcher, Tariq Ali, estimates that the Pakistan Navy's strength was reduced by a third during the conflict (Burke, 1974).

Aeronautical Operations

After the initial preemptive strike, the PAF went on the defensive in reaction to Indian reprisal. Air combat between India's IAF and Pakistan's PAF took place across various conflict zones; however the PAF's missions decreased with time as the war went on. Due to Pakistan's lack of non-Bengali technical personnel, the Indian Air Force flew over 4,000 sorties. The lack of vengeance may also explain the PAF High Command's deliberate choice to minimize its losses following the battle's devastating casualties. In response to an Indian Navy attack on Karachi, Pakistan's air force bombed Okha Harbour, destroying the invading vessels' fuel tanks. There was no sign of Pakistan's air force at all. Following the annihilation of Pakistan's No. 14 Squadron and the closure of Dhaka airfield, Indian air superiority in the east was achieved (Burke, 1974).

Attacks on Pakistan

Even as India's grip over East Pakistan increased, the Indian Air Force (IAF) continued to target Pakistan. A series of midnight raids by B-57 and Pakistani aircraft and Canberras and An-12 fighters was complemented by a fighter plane raid against an airport, anti-radar, and close support (India). The PAF employed defensive combat air patrols with F-6s to secure their own sites. A lack of air superiority, on the other hand, rendered the PAF's offensive operations ineffectual. A Canadian Caribou and Brigadier General Chuck Yeager's USAF Beech U-8 light twin was destroyed in Islamabad, while two American planes were damaged in Dacca (Aziz, 1974).

The IAF conducted airstrikes against Pakistani forward air sites in the West and large-scale interdiction and close-support operations until the war's conclusion. Jordanian F-104s, an unidentified Middle Eastern Ally's Mirages, and Saudi Arabian F-86s all joined the fight supporting the PAF. Pakistan's casualties were disguised as a result of their arrival. Libyan F-5s were sent to Sargodha to train Pakistani pilots in preparation for the expected arrival of additional F-5s from Saudi Arabia, which would account for their presence there. For instance, the IAF may engage in a wide variety of tasks, ranging from logistical support to air combat, deep penetration strikes and para dropping beyond enemy lines to bombing and surveillance. Pakistan's sole air-based military force was wiped out across the subcontinent in less than a week during the battle. Iran's air bases and concrete bunkers served as safe havens for the PAF's remaining planes (Aziz, 1974).

Following the fall of Dacca on the 15th, hostilities were formally proclaimed over on December 17th at 14:30 GMT. Although the pre-war boundaries were acknowledged in the aftermath of the

fight, India claimed significant land gains in West Pakistan and the independence of East Pakistan's wing as Bangladesh. India flew 1,978 sorties in the east, while the PAF conducted between 30 and 2,840 operations. Approximately 45 IAF aircraft were lost throughout the battle in close-support and interdiction operations (Riedel, 2012). 75 aircraft were destroyed in the strike on Pakistan. This score excludes F-6s, Mirage IIIs, and the six Jordanian F-104s that never returned to their owners. Neither of them. The Israeli Air Force's significantly higher sortie rate and emphasis on ground-attack missions, on the other hand, are to blame for the disparity in air loss rates. While India suffered 3,000 fatalities and 12,000 injuries on the ground, Pakistan suffered 8,000 fatalities and 25,000 injuries. It was made much more unbalanced by the loss of armored vehicles. Pakistan sustained a significant setback as a result of this (Riedel, 2012).

Ground Operations

It was the Indian army that successfully repulsed Pakistan's attempt to breach India's western border. By moving west, the Pakistani army acquired a total area of 5,795 square miles (15,010 square kilometers) of Pakistani territory (As a show of good faith, India later returned land it had acquired in Pakistani Kashmir, Pakistani Punjab, and Sindh provinces as part of the Shimla Agreement in 1972).

On the eastern front, the Indian army formed the Mitro Bahini alliance with the Mukti Bahini. It launched a three-pronged onslaught that included nine infantry divisions, attached armored units, and close air support (Allied forces). In contrast to the conflict of 1965, which was characterized by decisive battles and sluggish progress? India's invasion of East Pakistan was headed by General Jagjit Singh Aurora, who commanded the 8th and 57th divisions. Dhaka airport was rendered inoperable by the Indian Air Force, which quickly devastated Pakistan's meagre East Pakistani air force. The Indian Navy effectively blocked off East Pakistan. Blitzkrieg tactics led to a rapid win for India because they exploited the weaknesses in their opponents' defensive systems while avoiding any resistance. Tactics of "Blitzkrieg" After massive casualties, Pakistan's military capitulated in less than a month. Pakistani forces in East Pakistan were forced to surrender on December 16th.

Emergence of East Pakistan

On December 16th, 1971, the Indian Army's Eastern Command's General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, signed the Instrument of Surrender on behalf of Pakistani soldiers stationed in East Pakistan at 16.31 IST. Protesters began shouting Nazi and Pakistani slogans at Aurora as she acknowledged the surrender of her country (Raja, 2010).

Pakistani army and civilian allies were among the approximately 90,000 Indian POWs imprisoned in East Pakistan. A total of 79,676 uniformed individuals were imprisoned, including 55,692 soldiers, 16,354 members of the paramilitary, 5,296 police officers, 1,000 sailors, and 800 members of the Pakistan Air Force. Only military personnel's relatives and allies remained in captivity; the rest were civilians (razakars). A list of Pakistani prisoners of war compiled by Pakistan's Hamoodur Rahman Commission includes the following: About 15,000 Bengalis were kept captive throughout the fighting, in addition to the military (Raja, 2010).

Conclusion

Pakistan and India relations always stay on the worst page of the history. This study highlights the Pakistan and India relations during 1971. The relations between the both states gone worst during the era of 1971 while East-Pakistan and West-Pakistan's situation emerged bad. In this all game, initially, India played the hidden role which openly converted into the war between the Pakistan and India in 1971. This study shed light on the Pakistan and India relations during the



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