



EMERGENCE OF HELL IN THE WEST PAKISTAN-AFGHAN RELATIONS POST-9/11 ERA

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Abstract

Since the emergence of Pakistan from the British India, the relations between the Afghanistan and Pakistan always deteriorated due to various causes, such as insurgency from both sides, inference, crossbordering, blame gaming, Durand Line issue, Pashtoonistan issue, Language issue and many of other misunderstandings. This imperative study particularly shed light on the relations between the both countries during the post-9/11 era and explore how the both countries tried to develop the relations soon after the emergence of War on Terror in 2001, however, due to sum of misunderstandings these relations went worst. This research further explored the Pakistan's initiating steps to develop the all-groups government in Afghanistan that failed, as well as high representatives visits of the both countries to develop the confidence between both the states, funneled the million of dollars to Afghanistan and other developments to enhance the relations. These all actions fall into hell due to insurgency and interventions from both sides.

Keywords: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Relations, 9/11 incident, financial support

Historical Contextual

The Initiating Steps by Pakistan and Afghanistan

The event of 9/11 forced Pakistan to stop its policy of having a docile regime in Afghanistan. However, Pakistan changed the tone, not the tune, and hoped to have a friendly government in Afghanistan. "The hurried negotiations between the United States and Pakistan immediately after 9/11 changed Pakistan's behavior, but not its interests (Rubin, 2006)." Pakistan initially requested a delay so that it could build a "moderate Taliban" administration in Afghan region that may separate al Qaeda. By the Taliban's defeat, the Musharraf government stepped up its consular efforts to safeguard its security benefits in Afghanistan after the Taliban regime. Pakistan demanded the creation of a replacement administration in Afghanistan that encompassed all religious parties, as well as the "dominant" Pashtoons, as well as the attachment of "moderate" Pakhtuns. Taliban leaders will be included in any future administration as a reward for their assistance in the fight against terrorism (Grare, 2006). Pakistan indirectly utilised its clout to promote the concept that ignoring the Pakhtun popular would not lead to steadiness and peace. The United Front, Russia, and Iran, on the other hand, were adamantly opposed to any Taliban involvement. According to Dr. Abdullah of the United Front, there was no such thing as a moderate Taliban. Pakhtuns were a major source of concern for Pakistan. Alienation in Afghanistan but does not care about the 70 million Pakhtun's living under the British-made "draconian" law known as Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) (Peshawar, 1973).

Pakistan hoped that the agreement will usher in a new era of peace and stability in Afghanistan. When Pakistan opened its diplomatic office in Kabul on January 14, 2002, it

re-established formal relations with Kabul. Pakistan's foreign ministry spokesman stated that the UN-mediated political process for the restoration of permanent peace in Afghanistan would continue to get Pakistan's support and cooperation. President Musharraf congratulated Hamid Karzai over the phone. Pakistan has pledged \$100 million for Afghanistan's rehabilitation programmes. Pakistan likewise unilaterally reduced export tariffs to zero on various commodities in overland trade to Afghanistan, effective the first week of January 2002 (Shah, 2002). On January 10, 2002, Afghan Foreign Minister Hidayat Amin Arsalav visited Pakistan and held talks with his counterpart Shaukat Aziz. He said that political cooperation would benefit the people of both countries. Border authorities of both the countries met in the border town of Chaman in Pakistan and agreed to exchange criminals wanted by each side and would conduct a joint operation against the al-Qaeda elements (Fani, 2006).

The High Officials Visits

The Chairman of the Afghan interim administration, Hamid Karzai visited, along with a high-powered 20 member delegations, Pakistan on 8 February 2002, at the personal invitation of President Musharraf. During his visit, he said that "we, Afghans, have nothing but good will for Pakistan, and it is from the heart. We don't have to put it into or express it in any other form (Rais&Rais, 2008)". He also urged Musharraf "to forget the past" and rein in the Taliban (Rashid, 2008). In return Islamabad backed the Karzai administration by all means. A list of 877 Pakistani citizens, who were captured in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban, was handed over to Hamid Karzai for their release and repatriation to Pakistan. These Pakistani had gone to Afghanistan to fight together with the Taliban alongside the US. Karzai assured the Pakistani President of his help in the matter (Fani, 2006). Earlier in February the most outspoken member of the Karzai cabinet foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah also expressed the same feeling during his interview with *Eurasia Net* on Pak-Afghan Relations. Islamabad leadership announced the release of an amount of \$10 million to Afghanistan for the interim administration of Hamid Karzai (Shah, 2002). In April 2002, Pakistani President General Musharraf became the first president of a country in the area to visit Afghanistan, leading a ten-member team. Both heads of state discussed the prevention of terrorist safe-havens on both borders of the Pak-Afghan border, as well as refugee transfer commerce and the introduction of air service between the two nations' major cities. "We share a common history, a common religion, and there was no opportunity whatsoever for doing anything other than being brothers and working in mutual interests," President Musharraf stated during his visit (Fani, 2006). "President Musharraf also assured Afghanistan that ISI was under his full control and doing what was told to it (Rashid, 2008).

During Musharraf's visit to Kabul, the following understandings were reached the Afghan government would release Pakistanis held in Afghan jails, Pakistani banks would be opened in Afghanistan as soon as Afghan put "in place regulatory mechanism". Pakistani Consulate General would be re-opened in Qandahar. On May 21, 2002, Pakistan's minister for labour and manpower, Owais Ghani, and others landed in Kabul on the first PIA flights from Islamabad, marking the revival of a 23-year-old aviation link between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In Kabul on December 22, 2002, Pakistan and Afghanistan signed the agreement for good relations in Kabul and its Neighboring states. The surrounding countries' commitment to non-deddling in Kabul's domestic politics was reaffirmed in the Declaration. Pakistan interior ministry officials visited thrice in July and December 2004 to hold talks with Afghan officials on issues ranging from terrorism, gun-running, drug trafficking, and human smuggling. In this regard, a MOU finalized among the two countries (Khan, 2004).

On the 26th and 27th of December 2002, Pakistan's PM, Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, visited

Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and signed an agreement to resurrect the multibillion-dollar TAP gas pipeline project, which had been put on hold after Union Oil Company of California (ONCOL), a California-based group of corporations, left the venture following US missile strikes in 1998. A historic tripartite deal was made before the end of the year for the construction of a 1400-kilometer pipeline from Turkmenistan's Daulatabad gas field to Pakistan's Multan. The \$2.7 billion projects would make a significant contribution to Afghanistan's economy and help to link the economies of Southern and Central Asia (Ahmar, 2006).

President Karzai invited Pakistan's PM to Kabul on 12 January 2004. He was the first head of government to visit Kabul after the adoption of the new Afghan constitution. Officially the visit was portrayed as a success that helped enhance economic ties between the two countries (Government of Pakistan, 2003-4). In August 2004 Karzai visited Pakistan. As per Boon Accord, the *Loya Jirga* elected the interim Hamid Karzai as the head of the state for additional two years. Pakistan also provided, under American pressure, full support to the organizing in out-of-country Afghan presidential polls on 9 October 2004 (Government of Pakistan, 2004-5). Despite the huge distribution of money, the main factor for successful elections and Karzai's victory was the Taliban being calm. Taliban sources said that Karzai should be thankful to Pakistan. Pakistan had indirectly contacted Taliban leadership before elections and told them not to disturb the elections (Amir, 2007). "The largely peaceful conduct of Afghanistan's presidential elections on 9 October 2004... suggests that Pakistan can turn the Taliban on and off like a tap (Maley, 2006)." Pakistan doubled the assistance it offered in 2002, to \$100 million in 2005. By the end of June 2005 Pakistan provided 100 buses to Afghanistan (Bhatty, 2005). Pakistan's PM Shaukat Aziz also visited to Kabul in August 2005. At a joint press conference at the presidential palace both Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and President Karzai laudatory remarks for each other. Pakistan premier said that the two countries shared "a deep sense of togetherness and shared destiny (Usman, 2005)." President Karzai reciprocated in no less equal measure saying that "the two countries are like twin joined somewhere at the body, where anything that hurts one also hurts the other. The two nations have only one way to go forward and that is the way of friendship and cooperation (Government of Pakistan, 2005-6)."

The two margins settled to have 'seamless' towards security and destroy terrorism (Government of Pakistan, 2005-6). Both the states issued these propitious statements under the hope that they would be of mutual benefit to each other. Pakistan wanted to have maximum clout against its rival, India, and to earn the goodwill of the common Afghans; a majority of them blamed Pakistan for its interference in Afghanistan. Afghanistan's leadership was equally desirous to have good relations with Pakistan as for them Pakistan was the country that holds the key to the solution of terrorism-hit Afghanistan. Both countries were faced with the common challenge of terrorism.

Bilateral Trade Between the two Countries Since 2001

Despite the tension in bilateral relations on account of the war on terror, Pak-Afghan relations also witnessed some positive changes. The size of Islamabad's trade with the Kabul extended to more than 900 millions dollars within a limited times. Both countries also agreed to enhance social, cultural, and sports ties. In July/November 2002, Pakistan exported \$165 million worth of goods to Afghanistan more than \$180 million during the total 2001-02 fiscal years (Ahmar, 2006). Bilateral trade increased to \$500 million in 2004 (Sattar, 2007) and reached at \$1.5 billion in 2005-06 (Government of Pakistan, 2005-6). Pakistan and Afghanistan took further steps to increase bilateral trade.

These include the establishment of a third border crossingpoint at Ghulam Khan in North Waziristan, nine additional customs stations in the border area as well as a reduction in the duty of import of Afghan fruits. Duty on the import of Afghan fruit was reduced from 25 percent to 5 percent (Government of Pakistan, 2003-4). The first regular Pak-Afghan *Dosti* (friendship) Bus service between Pakistan and Afghanistan made its first run on 26 May 2006 after 27-year interruption. The bus service started with a comment from Jalalabad transport director Abdullah Wafa, who said: “We are not feeling any kind of hatred between Pakistan and Afghanistan; rather we felt extreme happiness to see such a wonderful welcome (Hussain, 2006)”.

Islamabad also started several developments in Kabul for instance roads developments, educational institutions, hospitals and providing training to Afghan nationals in different sectors. The government of Islamabad committed the grant in assistance for the reconstruction of Afghanistan spread over 5 years. The reconstruction of the road network in Afghanistan had an allocation of \$30 Million. Pakistan's Frontier Works Organization built approximately 75 Kilometer long Torkham-Jalalabad Road (Raja, 2006) with 2065 million rupees. Work on Torkham-Jalalabad Road was started in February 2004 and completed on 31st July 2006 (The Daily Mashriq, 2006). Pakistan helped Afghanistan in the rebuilding of Jalalabad-Kabul highway under the auspices of the European Union. Pakistan extended help to Afghanistan is working on the renovation of Rahman Baba High School and the creation of faculty blocks at different educational institutions. Pakistan further gave \$250 million for Afghanistan's reconstruction so far (Government of Pakistan, 2005-6).

Good Wills to Bad Wills

Despite all the good gestures by both sides, Pak-Afghan relations remained hostage to suspicions. In late January 2002 Afghanistan Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah went to Washington and asked the US authorities to prevent the Taliban from regrouping on its soil (Rashid, 2008). The new administration of President Hamid Karzai did not entertain good feelings towards Pakistan and there was a general feeling of distrust among the Afghans regarding Pakistani intentions. For Islamabad to join the US-led WOT against the Taliban was a major policy shift. For years, Pakistan's Afghan policy focused on having a pliable regime in Kabul that would help Pakistan in achieving its national interests. In the changed circumstances after 9/11, Pakistan lost control of the events in Afghanistan. The situation reverted more or less to the pre-1996 era of mutual distrust and hostility. Despite all the confidence-building measures by Pakistan and Afghanistan Pak-Afghan relations remained tense as there was constant complaining and accusations by the Afghan government that Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar were in Pakistan, Pakistan was not doing enough to stop the Taliban and it wanted to “enslave” Afghanistan (Zahia, 2007). Top Taliban officials and Al-Qaeda elements including Osama bin Laden are believed to be active against the new regime of Hamid Karzai, the US, and ISAF in Afghanistan. The Afghan government frequently accused that “Taliban Sympathizer continue to remain active within Pakistan's security apparatus (Weinbaum, 2006).” The Afghan officials from time to time expressed doubts about the intention of Pakistan in its contest against the war on terror and blamed Pakistan for not doing enough in apprehending the remnants of Taliban and al-Qaeda and tolerating aggressive recruitment, training camps, and arms workshops on its territory. According to Tanvir Ahmad Khan, an ex-foreign Pakistani ambassador said that blaming Pakistan for heightened insurgency was to increase pressure on Pakistan's President Musharraf who was reliable only under pressure (Khan, 2007). Karzai also complained in an article written in Pakistani daily *The Daily Times* that “the war on terror cannot be fought in Afghan villages... It must be concentrated on the

sanctuaries of those who train, equip and motivate the extremist and send them out to hurt all. Afghan Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah made veiled reference to Pakistan that "security incidents in Afghanistan had been planned outside Afghanistan without naming any country (Fani, 2006). During his two days visit to Pakistan on 22 April 2003 Hamid Karzai met with President Musharraf and Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali and raised the issue of cross-border infiltration and harboring of Taliban leaders with Pakistan. In a statement to reporters following a meeting with President Musharraf, Karzai said that he had handed over names of several Taliban commanders such as including Abdul Ghani Baradar (Umar, 2010), these second in command to Mullah Omar, Mullah Dadullah, Mullah Akhtar Usmani, and Mullah Hafiz Ahmed. The Afghan government wanted them to be arrested. The Afghan President also stated that the list would be further streamlined and extended. However, Pakistani officials repudiated to have been handed over any such list during President Karzai's visit. Afghan Interior Minister Jalali also blamed increasing attacks inside Afghanistan on elements coming from the Pakistani side of the porous border. People were coming from across the border to attack Afghanistan and then escape across the border, Jalali told a joint news conference on July 24 during a two-day visit to Islamabad that both countries have agreed that neither side would allow subversive elements to use its territory for creating trouble in the others (Fani, 2006)." In the aftermath of Operation Anaconda launched in March-April by the US and its allies near South and North Waziristan, without informing Pakistan, the al-Qaeda and Taliban fled to the Tribal Area. In the mid of 2002, a US Army high official met Pakistani officials and informed about the Al-Qaeda and Taliban insurgents moving from Afghanistan to Pakistani tribal areas under the protection of the tribals peoples. So it was needed to dry up those "puddles and take out these crooks and eliminate them (Orakzi, 2009)."

On a visit to the USA, As expected, Pakistani President Musharraf stated that the Karzai government's writ did not extend beyond Kabul. The Afghan leadership vehemently rejected these remarks, describing them as intervention in Afghanistan's internal affairs. In Mazar-i-Sharif demonstration was held in front of the UN office, burnt the Pakistani flag and an effigy of President Musharraf. Pakistani ambassador, Rustam Shah Momand said that such an attack was likely following Karzai's speech criticizing general Musharraf's remarks. A Pakistani presidential source in Islamabad said that President Karzai spoke to the Pakistani President and apologized for the terrorism activity (Beijing Time, 2003). Shortly after the attack Karzai said, he "seriously condemned" the incident. "I will call him (President Musharraf) and apologize for this sad incident in the embassy and at the same time I will ask him for an explanation of what he said some days ago."

While the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were on the tense stage, on the same time, terrorists attacked on the Embassy of the Pakistan in Kabul that was the 4th attack within one and half decade. Unfortunately, Masud was in the power every time while attacking (Yousazai, 2003). "The sort of tension led to the formation of a tripartite commission in June 2003 that included Afghanistan Pakistan and the USA to settle the problem arising on the Pak-Afghan boundary. The decision makers finally decided to solve the boundary issue through global positioning system (Yousazai, 2003).

President Karzai underlined his displeasure with Pakistan's alleged aggressive practices on the border in Mohmand Agency in separate appearances with the media in late July, saying, "I want to establish bounds of the relationship between the two nations." We want to be pals. Second, we wish to trade and do business with each other.. Three we want a civilized relationship with Pakistan which avoids acts of aggression against

Afghanistan and support for extremism (Beijing Time, 2003),”Afghan officials also provided Pakistan with a list of suspected Taliban leaders thought to be hidden within Pakistan and requested additional assistance in locating them. In August 2003, Afghan Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani travelled to Pakistan to attend a meeting of the Pakistan-Afghanistan Joint Economic Commission. In the meeting, the Afghan Minister asked Pakistan to do away with the negative list (Fani, 2006).

President Karzai urged Pakistan's leadership to prevent radical Islamic groups in Pakistan from providing shelter and support to the "terrorists" responsible for the upswing in violence in Afghanistan that has killed over 400 people in the previous four months (Shaikh, 2007). “Afghanistan is affected by terrorism mainly from outside the country,” clergy who, he claimed, were openly recruiting recruits from Maddares in Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, which were run by pro-Taliban extremist Islamic organisations, he demanded immediate action from the Pakistan government. Afghan President handed over a list of terrorists working in Pakistani territory with their complete information to take actions against (Grare, 2006). On 22 June 2006, President Karzai went even further by criticizing the fact that the war on terror was being conducted solely in Afghanistan. He demanded from the international community to take action against the terrorists cut their sources of funding and attack their training camps outside Afghanistan, “implicitly pointing to Pakistan (Grare, 2006).” Former Guantanamo Bay captives, Abdur Rahim Muslim Dost and Badaruzzaman Badr, (both are brothers), wrote that Pakistan handed over scores of suspects including them to the US authorities, most of them later proved to be innocent, in return for US dollars (Shah, 2006). There is another account that Pakistani authorities arrested foreign militants and al-Qaeda elements and did not crackdown on Taliban as vigorously as some members of the Pakistan military “still view them as potentially valuable assets for projecting Pakistani influence in Afghanistan (Markey, 2007).”

In September 2006 just three days after signing an agreement with the Taliban in North Waziristan President Musharraf visited Afghanistan where he admitted that there were Al-Qaeda and Taliban in both Pakistan and Afghanistan (Rashid, 2008). However, in his speech to members of Afghan *Wolesy Jirga* (Lower House) and other dignitaries he categorically told that to blame ISI, was tantamount to blame him. He said it was a wrong perception that ISI was involved in destabilizing Afghanistan. If Pakistan was involved in Afghanistan then who killed 500 Pak Army personnel? He told Afghan members of Parliament that “the best way to fight this common enemy is to join hands, trust each other and form a common strategy (Rashid, 2008).” He tried his best to dispel the fog of ‘suspicion’ that clouded Pak-Afghan relations (Shaikh, 2006a).

Musharraf and Karzai met in Washington in September 2006. During a dinner hosted by President Bush, Pakistan's President Musharraf remarked rather undiplomatically that the writ of the Karzai government did not extend beyond Kabul. Karzai accused Musharraf of harboring the Taliban (Rice, 2011), and told Musharraf that no country should use extremism as an “instrument of policy (Rashid, 2008)”. President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf claimed in an interview with CNN that President Karzai "did not realise that officials in his government were weakening Pakistan by fuelling the insurgency in Balochistan.” Pakistan's President General Musharraf thoughtless bombast about the Kabul leadership was rejected by the Afghanistan decision makers. Sibghatullah Mujaddedi, the head of Afghanistan's Senate, also accused Pakistan's ISI of planning a suicide murder attempt on his life. Afghanistan urged that Pakistan stop naming its missiles after Afghan heroes, such as the Ghorri missile, because the relationship had become so strained (Haqqani, 2006).

Suggestion to Solve the Boundry Lines Issues

Due to Afghan and US accusations that terrorism in Afghanistan was being sustained and supported from Pakistani soil, Pakistan suggested to put a fence on the boundryline between both the states to stop the terrorism activities and explained "Islamabad is considering a fencing the Durand Line and planting landmines on its side of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border to stop infiltration of people and contraband." He further told that "... Kabul leadership failed to handle the issues and blaming Pakistan for interference in Afghanistan (Daily Times, 2006)." Regarding the Taliban infiltration in Afghanistan, in September 2005, President Musharraf suggested the fencing and mining of the Durand Line. "Let anyone who's going from here get into the mines. We will fence the borders. Let's fence the borders (Janjua, 2009)." The Afghan president stated that he will take any means necessary to prevent mines from being put on the border, stating that "placing mines will not get us anywhere." The Durand Line is disputed, according to Afghan Interior Ministry spokesman Lutfullah Mashaal, who also told Afghan News Agency Pazhwak that the Durand Line could not be acknowledged unless the boundary was determined under the idea of fence and mining. He did, however, propose forming a joint Pak-Afghan commission to monitor the Line (The Daily Times, 2005). It was deduced from Afghanistan's refusal to fence and mine the Durand Line in order to maintain the question of the Durand Line's legitimacy open. The Line would undoubtedly stamp the legality of the border if it were fenced. Some experts were also against the idea of mining because it could have the opposite effect. These experts highlighted Bosnia, Cambodia, and Peru as examples of places where locals dug up mines and then sold them (Moman, 2007).

Conclusion

A history of Pakistan and Afghanistan relations is not very good that showed number of up and down between both the countries. This study particularly focused on the relations of the both countries since the emergence of War on Terror in 2001. Since the emergence of Pakistan, the relations between the Pakistan and Afghanistan always deteriorated due to number of issues, such as insurgency from both sides, inference, crossbordering, blame gaming, Durand Line issue, Pashtoonistan issue, Language issue and number of other misunderstandings. This imperative study particularly shed light on the relations between the both countries during the post-9/11 era and explore how the both countries tried to develop the relations soon after the emergence of War on Terror in 2001, however, due to number of misunderstandings these relations went worst. This research further explored the Pakistan's initiating steps to develop the all-groups government in Afghanistan that failed, as well as high officials visits of the both countries to develop the confidence between both the states, funneled the million of dollars to Afghanistan and other developments to enhance the relations. These all actions fall into hell due to insurgency and interferences from both sides. This research suggested to further work on the said topic in all perspectives so we can understand the actual history of the both countries relations.

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